Das Zeitdenken bei Husserl, Heidegger und Ricoeur (Phaenomenologica) (German Edition)

Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty

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If the book is still available they will be in touch with you shortly. Thank you for using SlugBooks, and please come back at the end of the term to list your book for other students. This book may be a custom edition only available through your bookstore. Save money by searching for another book above! Im dritten Teil wird das Zeitdenken Ricoeurs vorgestellt, mit einem besonderen Schwerpunkt auf seinen drei Aporien der Zeit.

The Turbulent History of a A History of the World, Our buyback partners are not buying this book at this time. SlugBooks Student Exchange If you have this book go ahead and post it here and your listing will appear for all students at your school who have classes requiring this specific book.

Post Anonymously Name Hidden. The third part contains a comprehensive presentation of Ricurs thinking on time, and shows at the same time a systematic unity in his later works. The historical analysis of the phenomenology of time under the systematic perspective of the aporias of time also exhibits the development of the phenomenological method, which rangesfrom a pure phenomenology to a hermeneutic and from there to a critical-hermeneutic phenomenology. Electronic book text Pages: Review This Product No reviews yet - be the first to create one!

Subscribe to our newsletter Some error text Name. Email address subscribed successfully. A activation email has been sent to you. Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty. Four Phenomenological Philosophers In this book, Christopher Macann guides the student through the major texts of the Each chapter is devoted to one of the four thinkers.

No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

My basic aim is to put into the hands of the reader, and within the compass of a single volume, a work enabling beginning students of phenomenology to find their way through the major texts of what will, I believe, in retrospect, be seen as one of the if not the most important philosophical traditions of the century.

My concern with the needs of students has dictated the format of the book. In my estimate, the four figures I deal with count as the most important phenomenological philosophers of this century—with no other figure falling into quite the same category of original, constructive thinking. Three of these four figures Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty each wrote one major work in which the substance of their phenomenological thinking is represented.

In order to keep the cost of this book down to a minimum, I have therefore deliberately chosen to ignore the other, often extensive, philosophical writings of these three figures. With Husserl, however, such a policy cannot be pursued. And so I have tried to cover all the texts which tackle the issues with which the student is required to be familiar. From personal experience, I know how difficult it is to move from an analytical foundation to a comprehension and assimilation of continental philosophy.

If I was ever able to make this shift when I went from an undergraduate training at Oxford to a graduate training in Paris, it was by dint of a deliberate decision, in my second year at Paris, to pretend I knew no philosophy at all, and so to begin all over again. This policy of deliberate ignorance made it possible for me to approach phenomenology with a fresh eye, free of the biases of my vii analytical background. For generations, phenomenology has been presented to students in the English-speaking world in the language and idiom of analytical philosophy, and therefore not merely in a language and idiom alien, but actually antithetical, to the spirit of phenomenology—partly, no doubt, with a view to diminishing the significance of phenomenological philosophy.

In view of the fact that the greatest phenomenological philosophers are now routinely classified amongst the greatest philosophers of the century, such an approach can no longer be sustained. This book is therefore not meant to replace a reading of the texts, either in the original German or French versions or in one or other of the many excellent translations which are at present available, but has been written to help students find their way through these always difficult, and often also long, texts.

It is a textbook in the strict and literal sense of that word, that is, a book designed to help students come to terms with the texts. He initially studied mathematics and physics at Leipzig and Berlin but his transfer to the University of Vienna inaugurated a shift in interest towards philosophy. In , he went to the University of Halle, where he became an assistant under Stumpf. In he obtained a full professorship at Freiburg im Breisgau, where he remained until his retirement.

There is no one work which stands in the same relation to the Husserlian philosophy that Being and Time, Being and Nothingness and Phenomenology of Perception stand in relation to the thinking of their respective authors. Though he later came to qualify some of the theses presented in his first major work, it is worth noting that the approach he adopts here sets the stage for the entire further development of his thinking. Indeed such an attempt may be taken to characterize the epistemological status of the first period in his philosophical development.

Psychologism, the view that the laws of knowledge can be derived from an understanding of the basic facts of psychic life, was a position represented by J. For Frege and Russell after him , the entire number series can be generated from these two fundamental concepts. Rather, the validity of these notions had to be exhibited in concrete synthetic activities and through a disclosure of the types of abstraction through which they were generated. With Meinong, the emphasis accorded to the unreality of the psychic object led to a multiplication of ontological regions, each with its own distinctive mode of representation, that is, with its own distinctive way of positing its object as ideal or inexistent.

What now ensures the invariability of the intentional object is not as it was with Meinong the invariability of the psychic content to which it is related. On the contrary, this psychic content, qua lived experience, can, with Husserl, undergo all kinds of variations, just as long as the wealth of psychic modifications is directed towards an object whose invariability is guaranteed by its ideality. The Logical Investigations The Logical Investigations are divided into a Prolegomena and six subsequent Investigations, of which the sixth is by far the longest.

The general movement of these six researches is from the formal to the material, from the abstract possibility of a science of sciences, through an investigation of meaning and its relation to language, to a concrete analysis of the structures of consciousness and their relation to experience and to the knowledge of that which is given in experience. However, for purposes of convenience, we shall not attempt to present the Logical Investigations Investigation by Investigation.

Instead, the substance of this long and often elaborate work will be conveyed with reference to six guiding themes: To some extent these themes arise in the course of the Logical Investigations in the same order in which they will be dealt with here, but only to some extent. In particular, the Sixth Investigation, the last and the longest, tends to pull together the themes of all the preceding Investigations under the one allembracing head of a phenomenology of truth and knowledge.

The Prolegomena assumes an anti-formalist position, because logical formalism disregards altogether the psychic life in which logical objectivities arise and through which they are sustained in being by, for example, a repetition of the same logical procedures on different occasions. It also assumes an anti-psychologistic position, because psychologism disregards, or rather regards as secondary, the ideal objectivities of formal thought by making them depend upon certain concrete acts of counting, inferring etc.

It is for this reason that the critique of psychologism takes up the greater part of the Prolegomena. Logic, especially in the very broad sense in which Husserl understands this term, obviously presupposes language, and indeed a quite special conception of language. This implies that meaning is in some sense prior to language and can therefore only be attained, in its phenomenological purity, through a series of exclusions. He begins to operate these exclusions in the First Investigation, by distinguishing signs Zeichen , on the one hand, from indications Anzeigen , on the other.

Sign is the most general term.

For every sign is a sign of something. But not every sign signifies. The point of drawing this distinction is to exclude indications Anzeigen from the general province of expressions, properly socalled, that is, the province of that whose function it is to signify, to give expression to. Husserl then goes on to distinguish, within the general province of signifying signs, that is linguistic expressions, a physical aspect from that aspect through which the expression is endowed with meaning. By the physical aspect of an expression, Husserl means the physiognomical gestures required for speech or writing, the contexts in which these gestures take place, as well as the outward manifestations of an expression—in the case of speech, audible sounds, in the case of writing, visible marks.

All of this is incidental to the function of signification which is disclosed in and through those acts which, as it were, animate the lifeless sounds and marks in question. Any statement, whether spoken or written, can function as an expression, and so also can any part of such a statement, the concepts or phrases of which it is made up. But a statement is only an expression in so far as it is viewed from the standpoint of what it seeks to express, from the standpoint therefore of an outward ex-pression pressing out of something in itself inward and hidden, not merely the meaning as such but the meaning just as it is intended by the very meaning-giving consciousness in question.

Conversely, when I understand an expression uttered by someone else, necessarily my understanding is predicated upon a sensational apprehension of the sounds emitted. But the understanding of the meaning is not reducible to this sensory input which, in the act of understanding, is immediately transcended towards the signification, what the sounds are taken to express.

In order to reinforce the ideality of his conception of signification, Husserl takes note of, in order to rule out as irrelevant, expressions in which something other than the expression of an objective intention is meant by the speech act in question. At the same time, Husserl will insist that occasional expressions, such as demonstratives, do also contain a core objective sense over and above that subjective sense which comes to them from the occasion of utterance. In the Fifth Investigation Husserl carries his phenomenology of language to its logical conclusion with reference to a function of nomination.

In the case of names, and provided we add the article to the relevant noun or noun complex, a position of existence is normally implied. Just as a name is used to affirm the existence of a thing which, as such, can feature as the subject of a predicative judgment, so a whole phrase can function in this nominal manner, in which case it requires completion in a judgment which furnishes a predicate.

Thus, in general, nominating presentations differ from judgments, and positing presentations which affirm existence from non-positing presentations. This appeal to the function of nomination has two results. First, it enables Husserl to treat states of affairs expressed in complex expressions as modifications of an act of simple nomination. Second, inherent in the function of nomination we find an objective reference, and this even before the introduction of questions concerning truth and intuitive fulfilment.

The discussion is then extended in such a way that the critical concept of an objectivating act can be employed to clarify and amplify the initially vague notion of intentionality. Every intentional Erlebnis is either itself an objectivating act or has such an act at its base—for example, if it expresses a desire for some state of affairs. Since, in the final analysis, objectivating acts have been shown to be nominating acts, the unity of intentional life can ultimately be founded in language, not in the sense that it is reducible to the latter but in the sense that we can have no access to intentional Erlebnisse save by way of corresponding forms of expression in and through which the Erlebnisse in question are objectified.

But the function of signification, the meaning-giving acts of consciousness together with their expression in language, cannot be considered independently of what is signified, the meant—and here we come to our third heading. An examination of the subjectively determined life of consciousness would be meaningless if it did not stand in relation to its intentionally determined objectivities.

Whereas certain of the Investigations, such as the First and the Fifth, will concentrate primarily upon the meaninggiving side of consciousness itself, others, such as the Second, the Third and the Fourth, will focus on the meant and the intentional idealities which are objectified thereby. The Second Investigation is specifically devoted to the problem of abstraction.

The former position is of course that of Platonic realism, which successfully defends the objectivity of essences but in so doing fails to trace them back to their sources in consciousness.

The latter position is mostly illustrated and critiqued with reference to British empiricism, which successfully traces the universality of general ideas back to a function of consciousness but fails to recognize the ideal objectivity of the essences derived by way of just such a procedure of abstraction.

Husserl more or less disregards Platonic realism and devotes virtually the whole of the Second Investigation to a critique of the psychologism implied in the empiricist doctrine of abstraction. Nothing is gained by turning from Locke to Berkeley or Hume. Ideational abstraction is the beginning of what Husserl will later call eidetic intuition, a type of intuition which is to be met with even in the foundations of logical thought, where it assumes the form of a categorial intuition Sixth Investigation. Returning to the act side of consciousness we find, especially in the Fifth Investigation, a different set of analyses concerned with a characterization of consciousness and of the concept of the ego appropriate to a phenomenological investigation.

Husserl begins with a threefold definition of consciousness: Husserl eventually opts for a version of the third and broadest conception of consciousness but only by way of a preliminary critique of the first two conceptions. The first conception of consciousness as a fluxional complex has to be disburdened of its empirical connotations. This is done, first, by refusing the presupposition of an objective reality and, in accordance therewith, by denying the legitimacy of the division of reality into two spheres, the external and the internal.

The appearance of the thing is not the appearing thing. The former is a psychological datum to which there corresponds a physical conception of the thing itself , the latter a phenomenological given.

Das Zeitdenken bei Husserl, Heidegger und Ricoeur (Phaenomenologica) (German Edition)

Moreover, the popular conception of Erlebnisse as what an individual lives through in terms of worldly events has also to be discarded. The latter is more or less identical with the unity of fluxional consciousness and so stands in no need of a superior egological principle. The second and more reflective concept of consciousness as rooted in a specific act of internal perception is then in turn dismissed in so far as it falls prey to the default of an infinite regression—a concept of consciousness rooted in an act of reflection which itself requires a higher consciousness still to EDMUND HUSSERL 11 reflect on it.

This preliminary examination of the first two misconceptions opens the way to an investigation of the third and broadest conception of consciousness as the phenomenologically purified unity of all intentional Erlebnisse. In the first place, by content might be meant both the actual content the lived experiences themselves and the intentional content that towards which such actual contents are directed.

The actual reell content is the precursor of what will later be known as the noesis and is identified here in order that there be no confusion when Husserl engages in the more significant analysis of the intentional content. On the side of the intentional content, however, further distinctions are needed; first and most obviously, the distinction between the object which is apprehended and the object as it is apprehended. Only the latter is pertinent to a phenomenological investigation of contents.

But second, within the general sphere of the intentional object as it is apprehended, it is necessary to distinguish between the matter of an intentional act and its quality. The matter of an intentional act indicates the content of an act as that which makes an act about this rather than some other objectivity. The quality of the act indicates the way in which the objectivity in question is posited, as affirmed, questioned, desired, imagined etc. Obviously, the same matter can be qualified in different ways and vice versa.

The same state of affairs can be successively affirmed, denied, desired, imagined and so on. For, strictly speaking, until now the course of the analyses has been guided by the question of signification not that of truth. But truth rests not just on the coherence and meaningfulness of linguistic expressions but on the relation of language to reality, the presence of the thing itself.

To be sure, the intentionality of consciousness was already pointing in this direction, more especially since the investigation of intentionality revolved around the disclosure of objectivating acts. But the reality towards which intentionality pointed had hitherto merely been presumed.

It is this presumptive orientation towards truth and knowledge which now becomes the explicit theme of a series of analyses. Husserl begins by recuperating a distinction alluded to earlier. For already in the First Investigation Husserl had drawn attention to a distinction between an empty intention of signification and the intuitive fulfilment of that empty intention.

However, in the end such an expression remains empty, or vacuous, unless it is or at least could be fulfilled through an appropriate intuition which presents the object in question. In the broader context of the Sixth Investigation this means that what an expression expresses, that is, its content, now calls for a threefold distinction between the content as intentional sense or meaning, the content as fulfilling that sense through, for example, sense experience and the content as object.

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In analytic epistemology, this relation is picked up through a theory of verification which itself presupposes the distinction of self and world, language and reality, and therefore also understanding and sensibility. To the Kantian question of the condition of the possibility of knowledge Husserl replies with an exposition of the coincidence not correspondence which necessarily obtains between signifying acts and the intuitive acts through which the former find their fulfilment. An example will help to clarify what Husserl has in mind; the statement: The statement is about a perception and is intuitively fulfilled through it.

But the signification does not depend upon it, as is clear from the fact that the same statement made in the absence of the relevant experience would at least be intelligible. Just as obviously, the word-sound does not contain the meaning, since the same statement made in an incomprehensible language would be meaningless. Rather, through the utterance of a word-sound combination, a signification is intended which receives its intuitive fulfilment from the actual perception.

In case I am someone else, at least two sets of intuitions are required for knowledge to be possible, the intuitive apprehension of the word-sound which must then be endowed with meaning and the intuitive apprehension of the perception intended by the one uttering the word-sound combination.

One can almost hear Wittgenstein complaining: By producing a second image to confirm the first? Would this not be like buying a second copy of the same newspaper to check the truth of the first? To this simple, phenomenological model of knowledge, a model based upon a series of distinctions between the act of intentional signification, the verbal expression, the intuitive fulfilment of this intention and the resulting knowledge, Husserl then adds a number of additional complications.

First, there can be a temporal lag between the act of expression and that of fulfilment or of confirming knowledge. The static structural model of knowledge requires completion by a more dynamic model which allows for such lags. This is especially true in the case of fulfilment through a manifold of so-called adumbrations, the object first from this side and then from that.

Just as important, the existence of such lags allows for the opposite of confirmation. The first part of the Sixth Investigation concludes with a chapter V on evidence. Evidence is defined in terms of fulfilment, more specifically, in terms of a series of approximations to the ideal of a final fulfilment. An imaginative fulfilment represents a certain degree of fulfilment which, at the other extreme, is perfectly represented by the givenness in itself of the object.

Where an intention of signification has procured final fulfilment through an ideally complete perfection the genuine adequatio rei et intellectus is provided for. In other words, truth as idea is based upon the idea of adequation, or of an objectifying signification which finds its fulfilment through such an adequation, while the latter in turn points beyond itself to something truth as being which exists as the foundation for the possibility of just such an adequation. This correlation truth as idea and truth as being makes it impossible to hypostasize a reality existing independent of consciousness.

For being itself is, or can be, given in the truth of evidence in an originary way. The second part of the Sixth Investigation is largely devoted to the famous issue of categorial intuition. A good way to come to terms with this notion is to see it as a reformulation of the Kantian problem of a priori synthetic judgments. We are already familiar with this order of formal intuition from the Second Investigation.

Interpreting Husserl: Critical and Comparative Studies (Phaenomenologica)

Two other major features of this theory of categorial intuition should be noted. First, the theory incorporates a concept of founding which permits Husserl to establish what might be called an epistemological hierarchy. At the lowest level we find significations relating to particular objects of sensible intuition. Founded in such basic sensible intuitions, we find higher order generalities such as those depicted in concepts of properties.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, we find an upper level of pure logical objectivities. To take a first, Husserl insists: Categorial intuition gives these new objectivities not through any act of reflection upon lower order objectivities but through an act of fulfilment which is analogous to that operative in ordinary sensible intuition. But he does the very opposite, seeking an intuitive analogue for such categorial forms in a distinctive categorial intuition. Categorial intuition is therefore that form of intuition in which these new objectivities are actually given in person. To be sure, acts such as those of conjunction and disjunction are founded in objects given simultaneously, but the categorial form is not reducible to these objects nor to any association which consciousness automatically establishes between them.

The founded acts upon which categorial intuition is based could not exist without the founding acts of sensible intuition. Let us take as a second instance the specific case of the notion of identity. For Husserl, the origin of this notion is to be sought in sensible perception and the intuitive fulfilment connected with such a first order intuition. The manner in which, for instance, the parts of a serial perception presenting different sides of an object fuse and coincide to form the presentation of one and the same thing offers a first instance of the notion of sameness, a notion which merely functions here as an organizing principle in the course of perception.

We should not be in any doubt as to the largeness of the claims Husserl makes on behalf of his investigations. From a Husserlian standpoint, the pure laws of thought which a phenomenological elucidation brings to light are not in any way dependent upon the contingencies of the human understanding. Any rational understanding capable of living through acts of thought in some way or other would eventually be brought to recognize these a priori laws of thought. For this very reason there is no need of any metaphysical explanation for the congruence of the course of nature with the nature of our understanding.

For this essential congruence is itself brought to light in the work of phenomenological elucidation. Not until Ideas I does Husserl work out in detail the two main ideas which are fundamental to his transcendental phenomenology, the idea of the reduction and the complementary idea of a sphere of immanence or of immanental consciousness. Critical to an understanding of the significance of this idea is the distinction between a first and preliminary conception of the immanent-transcendent distinction and a second and conclusive conception of this same distinction.

The starting point for the entire series of analyses is the question: A first answer to this question is offered in terms of the phenomenologically inadequate distinction of the inner and the outer.

The immanent is in me, the transcendent outside of me. In order to preserve this distinction from the naivety of a conception of the mind as a sort of receptacle for conscious contents Husserl draws a distinction between reale and reelle Immanenz. Whatever is actually lived out—perceived, thought, imagined, remembered— is, in so far as it is a lived experience, free from doubt.

The indubitability of immediate self-givenness goes along with the concept of immanence, even in this preliminary sense of the term. To put it in the simplest terms, this first conception of the distinction between the immanent and the transcendent suffices to substitute for the epistemologically naive subject-object distinction a more sophisticated distinction between act and object.

Due to the intentionality of consciousness, the act side of consciousness cannot be regarded as a self-enclosed sphere of subjectivity since the life of consciousness is always actively directed towards its object.

Das Zeitdenken Bei Husserl, Heidegger Und Ricoeur (English, German, Electronic book text)

The trouble with this first concept of immanence is that it excludes too much. Involved in the objective sciences is the doubtfulness of transcendence, the question: How can cognition reach beyond itself?

How can it reach a being that is not to be found within the confines of consciousness? The seemingly incidental reference to the dubiousness of the mathematical sciences is the key here. For as purely formal, the mathematical sciences contain nothing material. Their objects are themselves universal essences and so can themselves be given with that indubitability which characterizes any apprehension of essences within the life of consciousness.

This means that essences are absolutely given even though they are not actually immanent. From which Husserl concludes: For that which is universal is absolutely given but is not actually immanent. The act of cognizing the universal is something singular. As a result, it turns out that the above concept of the actually reell immanent is only a limiting case of a much wider concept of immanence—and the same holds of the concept of transcendence.

From this Husserl draws two conclusions: The phenomenological reduction already suffices to exclude what is really real transcendent. But so far from wanting to exclude the entire sphere of the actually im reellen Sinne transcendent, it is the task of a phenomenological philosophy to include within the sphere of immanence the entire field of objective correlates, more specifically, all those ideal objectivities which can now be comprehended from the standpoint of their essential structure.

The very task of phenomenology can now be conceived as the analysis of those EDMUND HUSSERL 19 systems of correlation which obtain between the diversity and multiplicity of actually given lived experiences and the essential structures which are posited as the ideal objects of just such a manifold of lived experience. From the standpoint of this new concept of immanence, what was previously regarded as transcendent transcendent to the life of consciousness must now be treated as immanent, and as such available for an analysis whose descriptions operate within the scope of the criterion of indubitable self-evidence.

To put it in more Cartesian language, the sphere of immanence now no longer merely includes the Ego and the cogito or cogitatio but also that of the cogitatum or cogitationes. Whereas The Idea of Phenomenology can be treated as an introductory text, this is not the case with The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness of which, if we include the supplements added between the years and , makes a major contribution to phenomenological philosophy in one quite specific domain, that of time consciousness.

The importance of this study cannot be exaggerated because, in a certain sense, the phenomenology of time consciousness is the phenomenology of consciousness per se, since all conscious contents are, to speak in Kantian language, given subject to the condition of time. By way of introduction, three points should be made. It is noteworthy that many of the secondary studies on this work ignore or fail to come to terms with the third section. Husserl begins his analyses with the example of a melody.

A melody consists in the sounding of a succession of tones.

But in order that a succession of such sounds be grasped in the unity of a melody the preceding tones have to be retained as the playing proceeds on to the succeeding. Moreover, and especially if the melody is one with which I am familiar, in addition to the retention of preceding tonal moments I am able to anticipate those to come. My ability to grasp the sequence of sounds in the unity of a melody is thus dependent upon this dual orientation of intentions, retentional directed towards the past and protentional directed towards the future.

These acts now have to be contrasted with acts which take us explicitly back to the past or on into the future. Husserl himself tends to accord far less consideration to acts oriented towards the future and indeed has no specific name for the complement of memory. In the present, the past is re-produced in memory or pre-viewed in prediction. However, it is important to note that there is an actuality of representation in phantasy just as there is an actuality of present experience. For it is in the actual present of representative phantasy that I re-present a past or a future present.

With this proviso, let us now turn our attention to the act upon which Husserl concentrates his attention, the act of reproduction. The first tone is no longer given in actuality but it is reproduced in phantasy. Further, with the passage to the second tone, and ever thereafter, the same structure of retention and protention which pertains to the original lived experience now also pertains to the representation. With the representation of the second tone, there is a retention of the first and a protention of the third and so on.

Nevertheless, just as in the case of an original presentation, the unity of the melody, as represented, is attributed to the structures of retention and protention appropriately modified to accommodate the different demands of representation. Within the sphere of reproduction in general, it is also important to distinguish between phantasy and recollection. I can imaginatively represent a remembered melody, that is, simply make it present to me now in image, or I can represent it in such a way that a reference to the past is implied. In what does the difference consist?

Obviously, I cannot go back to the past to check on the actual occurrence of what I remember, so the difference must lie in the way in which the melody is represented. Recollection not only posits what is reproduced but in so doing gives it a position in time more or less explicitly with regard- -to the present. Phantasy, on the other hand, only remembers as a current performance which brings with it no explicit relation to the past. Thus, in running through a remembered melody, I do not need to recall the occasions on which it was heard in the past and may indeed have entirely forgotten the past contexts which made the current performance possible.

Husserl not only thinks that there is, but draws the further conclusion that this experience furnishes the only adequate evidence for our belief in the existence of a past in which events actually took place in a manner corresponding to that in which they are remembered to have taken place. In the actual present in which certain past contents are still retained and so are, in this sense, still actually perceived, I can reproduce these EDMUND HUSSERL 23 same contents in such a way that there results a certain coincidence of retained and reproduced contents.

The reproduced contents, as empty intentional representations, find their evidential fulfilment in the retained contents. Moreover, something similar may be assumed to take place in the case of protentions.

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