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Amphibious operations, which can enhance options and opportunities, were not used during the war.
Even the knowledge of submarines had been largely undeveloped. The areas of primary interest that have been identified by the Indian Navy as areas that need attention include: The secondary areas of interest include: India acted in Maldives to restore the democratically elected government in ; activities in the context of Sri Lanka both, as rescue missions and tackling threats from across the border; rescue mission to evacuate Indian, Sri Lankan and Nepali citizens from Lebanon in ; and the anti-piracy mission taken up since off the Gulf of Aden.
The Indian Navy envisages four types of roles for itself: Military, Diplomatic, Constabulatory and Benign.
Moreover, India must expand its strategic foothold in multilateral fora and organisations. Air Cmde R A Maslekar. Showdown At Dabiq Islamic State…. The argument that the littoral states did not have the naval capabilities to replace the British and maintain order in the Indian Ocean Region IOR was contested by India. About the Author B.
The military role is the key role that any Navy is expected to play, it may involve deterrence, active engagement, securing territorial integrity, safeguarding sea lanes, etc. The diplomatic role entails use of naval power in support of foreign policy. While the constabulatory tasks are secondary, the increasing incidence of maritime crime has brought this dimension to the forefront. The objectives here are coastal defence including the defence of EEZ. Anti-piracy is one of the key tasks in this context. The benign role is essentially humanitarian in nature, providing rescue and relief operations.
The Vasco da Gama landing had opened up India to the Western world. It was the beginning of a new era in the sense that the earlier sea route trade contacts of the Middle East had only a very limited impact. Unfortunately, the enormity of the entry of a Western Power in this manner did not strike any resonance in the Indian mind. A nation that at one time had seen a glorious maritime history under the Cholas and the Pandyas lost out on its maritime perspective. It is that mindset that needs to be rekindled, and an awareness of the maritime domain to be created.
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Security in the Indian Ocean Region- Role of India. India has legitimate security concerns in the IOR, which falls in its strategic backyard, especially with China. DOWNLOAD SECURITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION ROLE OF INDIA security in the indian pdf. 10 indoor security cameras for a smarter home or office.
Please enter your name here. You have entered an incorrect email address! Authors Dr Prabhakaran Paleri. Rear Admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande. Air Cmde R A Maslekar. Lt Gen PG Kamath. Lt Gen VM Patil. During his call on the Seychelles, he concluded five agreements with the Seychellois Government covering renewable energy, infrastructure development and hydrographic surveys. More important was the agreement pertaining to the lease of Assumption Island for the development of its infrastructure.
This will enable India to keep a close vigil over any Chinese warships in the area.
India must realise that its naval capabilities are much weaker than those of China. The latter possesses four nuclear ballistic missile submarines, while India has one nuclear attack submarine, the Akula -class INS Chakra. The Indian defence establishment has also given a green light to the construction of 24 submarines by or thereabouts. For instance, India has not undertaken appropriate measures to improve and strengthen its naval capabilities to counter maritime terrorism and piracy, in light of the Mumbai terror attacks.
A host of pragmatic measures are needed. First, India needs to further elevate, strengthen and deepen its security co-operation with regional partners such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius, as well as the United States, Japan and Australia, to protect its core security interests in the Indian Ocean. Second, India needs to develop hard and soft power resources to ensure its maritime security and to be able to deal with any contingent situation that might arise from any future Sino-US conflict in the South China Sea.
Moreover, India must expand its strategic foothold in multilateral fora and organisations. Today, with the exponential development of modern weaponry, unprecedented communications technology and vast intelligence resources, maritime threats have amplified. Third, any quadripartite partnership of India, Japan, the United States and Australia should not be exclusively focussed on isolating China as some kind of pariah state. Rather, China must be engaged as a co-operative partner in the process of negotiations to resolve mutual differences in the spirit of protecting the global commons.
Fourth, if it is to meet the challenges — either real or perceived — posed by China to its maritime interests in the Indian Ocean Region, India will be required to develop a multipronged strategy of maintaining an active and agile presence in the IOR by integrating its army, air force and navy in fuller co-operation and co-ordination with the central and state governments.
India and China will remain strategic rivals due to their competing energy and security interests in the Indian Ocean Region. By logical extension, India will need to improve its maritime infrastructure and upgrade its naval capabilities. Mere drum beating under the Act East Policy will not be enough to deliver the goods since India is faced with divergent maritime threats and challenges of a vast scale, magnitude and intensity to its maritime borders.
It cannot protect those maritime borders and ensure its energy security without the co-operation of, and intelligence sharing with, regional partners. But co-operative security mechanisms cannot be developed unless there is a convergence of perceptions on common regional security interests among regional and extra-regional powers. The time has come for India to build sturdy and stable partnerships with other liberal democratic states, in particular the United States, Japan and Australia. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that any partnership is not exclusively directed against China, for the latter is already a global power with a global reach in every domain.
It would thus be a chimera to contain China; rather, China needs to be more fully co-opted into the evolving global and regional security architecture.
Achieving that will better serve the common interests of all states, including China, in a co-operative security mechanism. More importantly, India needs to shed off the dominant-dependent psyche that it suffers from. It must treat its South Asian neighbours on an equal footing with due respect to each partner in a co-operative security order. The fact is that India is still perceived as a regional hegemon.
In a broader context, if India is unable to liberate itself from the deeply entrenched psyche of keeping itself at a distance and to press ahead with forging strong strategic partnerships with Pacific states, an Indo-Pacific common security order cannot be a reality. The time has come for India to revise its old political shibboleths and psychological inhibitions. Oxford University Press India has not learnt any lesson from the Mumbai terror attacks by way of undertaking efficacious measures to deal with future instances of maritime terrorism.