Australia And Southeast Asia (The Crystallization Of A Relationship)


Washington applauded the ASEAN-China agreement on a framework for a code of conduct for the South China Sea, urging that the actual code be legally binding, a stipulation opposed by China. In its early months, the Trump administration has devoted little attention to Southeast Asia and US relations with the region have generally followed a trajectory set by the Obama administration. There have been mixed signals between Manila and Washington.

His secretaries of state and defense also made multiple journeys to the region. The United States also increased the deployment of ships and aircraft to the region, particularly in Singapore, the Philippines, and Australia. Direction from Washington for a region that was so important during the preceding eight years seems to be absent. The rather bizarre behavior of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte dominated the news in late The former Davao mayor displayed his well-known anti-US feelings while aggressively pursuing his allegedly extrajudicial campaign against Philippine drug trafficking.

There were also threats to end all bilateral military exercises and to terminate bilateral defense agreements. Elsewhere, the US continued to focus attention on maritime security while avoiding direct involvement in the emerging controversy over treatment of the Muslim population in Rakine State, Myanmar.

The Obama administration has achieved only a portion of its Asian rebalance strategy in Southeast Asia. Despite these advances, US presidential electoral politics are presenting new obstacles. It was only partially successful. However, security cooperation hardly advanced. US relations with Southeast Asia encompassed all three pillars of its rebalance to Asia: Diplomatic engagements included visits to the region by the president, the secretaries of state and defense, and a number of senior aides to attend multilateral meetings.

Commitment to the economic pillar led to the conclusion of negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership TPP trade agreement. If ratified by the signatories, the TPP would be the most comprehensive trade and investment arrangement in the world, though a number of obstacles in many of the countries do not portend a quick or easy confirmation. Senior State and Defense Department officials made several visits to Southeast Asia over the summer months, assuring their hosts that the US remained committed to a robust air and naval presence in the region, and assisting the littoral countries of the South China Sea in developing maritime security capacity.

Washington is particularly focused on providing a rotational military force presence in Southeast Asia. On the South China Sea territorial disputes, US officials emphasized the need for peaceful approaches to conflict settlement among the claimants, pointing to arbitration and negotiation based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Others have problems meeting several requirements associated with the partnership. The US is building a rotational force deployment capacity in the region along with military assistance to allies and partners, especially for increasing their maritime security capabilities.

Problems persist in US-Thai relations as the military consolidates its rule. Finally, Japan and India have shown support for maritime security buildups and an enhanced naval presence in the South China Sea. In the Philippines, there was some progress on implementing the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, though opponents have challenged its constitutionality. There were also suggestions that the US is reconsidering its ban on weapons sales to Hanoi. The US raised its profile in Southeast Asia with a series of high-profile visits and events in early President Obama visited Malaysia and the Philippines, stops he had cancelled last fall because of the US government shutdown.

Broad movement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership was held hostage to disagreements between the United States and Japan. Faced with a government shutdown and a debt default crisis, President Obama canceled an extended visit to Southeast Asia. The US rebalance toward Asia continued with financial commitments to enhancing maritime security, announcements of military sales, deployment of an additional Littoral Combat Ship to Singapore, and calls for accelerated negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement.

The robust response by the US to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines was widely viewed as a concrete example of the ongoing US security commitment to its allies and partners. The Philippines has linked its military modernization and overall external defense to the US rebalance. Washington is also stepping up participation in ASEAN-based security organizations, sending forces in June to an nation exercise in Brunei.

An economic agreement was the chief deliverable. Moreover, much of the motivation for the rebalance, according to these officials, comes from Southeast Asians pressing for US leadership. In the realm of defense, the US emphasizes assisting partners to improve their own capabilities and working within security-related institutions such as the East Asia Summit — the premier forum for political-security issues in Asia. Washington is supporting security improvements in a number of countries in the region, including the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

Alongside these growing partnerships, however, are US criticisms of human rights problems in the Indochinese countries, Burma, and Indonesia that add friction to the relationships. Secretaries Clinton and Panetta also spent time in the region, the latter reinvigorating defense ties with Thailand and linking US security interests among Australia, India, and Southeast Asia. The US suspended many prohibitions against private investment in Myanmar, though human rights-based sanctions remain.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue, Panetta outlined an ambitious plan for enhanced military partnerships with regional friends and allies, though how a reduced US military budget will impact these plans is a growing concern in Southeast Asia. US attention was focused on both ends of Southeast Asia: Attacks and explosions in Thailand and the Philippines were a reminder that terrorism is still a serious threat. Southeast Asian reactions to the announcement of an increased rotation of US military assets to Australia range from ambivalence in Indonesia to enthusiastic endorsement in the Philippines and Singapore.

At the East Asia Summit EAS , Obama outlined his hope that it could serve as a high-level security conclave whose agreements would be implemented through other multilateral organizations. Hoping for a breakthrough in US-Burma relations, Obama sent Clinton to see whether the situation warranted the easing of US economic sanctions and if Naypyidaw was moving to meet US conditions for the restoration of full diplomatic relations.

Manila also maintained its efforts to obtain a specific defense commitment from the US in the event of a military conflict with China over South China Sea islands. The Cambodia-Thai border dispute continues to flare periodically. ASEAN mediation efforts have established a timetable for military disengagement but, as yet, no implementation. In Indonesia, radical Jemaah Islamiyah, al Qaeda-affiliated cleric Abu Bakar Bashir was sentenced to 15 years in jail for aiding the formation of a new terrorist affiliate in Aceh. As in his previous trials, Bashir blamed his arrest and sentence on US and Jewish machinations.

New ships and radar installations as well as navy and coast guard training are being provided by the US. Wikileaks releases of US embassy cables published in the Australian press critical of President Yudhoyono caused some tension between Jakarta and Washington. US relations with Vietnam and Cambodia continue to be strained over human rights concerns. While ASEAN has called for the lifting of economic sanctions on Burma since its recent national election and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, Washington seems in no hurry to follow suit, labeling the election as fatally flawed and noting that political prisoners remain in jail.

In all her Southeast Asian stops, she emphasized the importance of human rights. Washington is considering new financial sanctions against Burma, recognizing that more engagement with the military regime has not yielded the expected results. The presence of US military trainers in the southern Philippines continues to rile leftist and nationalist legislators. As a sign of growing warmth in US-Malaysian relations, Kuala Lumpur is sending a small contingent of medical personnel to Afghanistan. Washington also restored military-to-military relations with Kopassus , the Indonesian Special Forces unit that has been accused of egregious human rights violations in Timor, Papua, and Aceh.

In mid-May, long-simmering political tension in Thailand between the Bangkok elite establishment and urban lower classes as well as those in northern Thailand who feel ignored by the center erupted in the worst political violence in decades. Tentative US efforts to mediate were rejected by the Thai government, though the opposition appeared to welcome a US role. A tense calm has been restored, but the prospect for renewed violence is palpable. The US is also concerned that Burma may be clandestinely importing materials from North Korea for a nascent nuclear weapons program.

The administration proved to be prescient in its warning last fall that greater engagement with the Burmese regime would not likely reap short-term gains when the junta announced restrictive election laws. However, in the first quarter of the US also moved forward on two regional initiatives — strengthening its interest in the TransPacific Trade Partnership, which could be a route to trade liberalization with several Southeast Asian countries, and preparing to establish a Permanent Mission to ASEAN.

At the end of the quarter the US and Vietnam signed a landmark Memorandum of Understanding on the development of civilian nuclear power facilities, a bilateral segue to the multilateral nuclear summit that Obama will host with 43 heads of state in mid-April. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced an extension of the deployment of U. Gates also announced an expansion of U.

While expressing shock and offering condolences to Indonesia in the wake of the July terrorist bombings of two hotels in Jakarta, Washington praised the Indonesian police in mid-September for tracking down and killing the perpetrator of the attacks, notorious Jemmah Islamiyah leader, Mohammad Noordin Top. USAID is organizing a new program to assist civic social organizations in the troubled Thai south to promote governance and human rights. Meanwhile, the Philippine Congress is scheduling new hearings on the Visiting Forces Agreement for its alleged unduly favorable treatment of U.

Human rights concerns in Southeast Asia were raised again in the annual U. Nevertheless, she stated that the U. Southeast Asian leaders welcomed Illinois Sen. The Democrats have also taken a tougher position on human rights. In general, though, no significant change is foreseen in U. The cancellation of a draft peace agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippine government triggered renewed violence in the Philippine south and allegations that U.

Both Manila and Washington deny the charges, though U. Special Operations Forces have been training the Philippine military in Mindanao since Malaysian leaders responded angrily that the U. So, in contrast to the massive aid effort for Indonesia in the December tsunami aftermath, assistance has only trickled into Burma, and mostly controlled by the Burmese military.

On a bilateral level, U. Incremental gains were seen in security ties with U. For the Philippines, Washington has promised more economic and military aid focused primarily on the restive south but partially conditioned on a better human rights performance. Human rights concerns also dominated U. Extensive combat, antiterrorism, and humanitarian assistance scenarios were included.

President Bush condemned the Burmese junta for its brutal suppression of anti-regime demonstrations. Antiterrorist support dominated U. The Indochinese states were featured in several U. Washington continued to press for the restoration of democracy in Thailand, looking forward to elections in December. Military-to-military ties with Indonesia were significantly enhanced this quarter as plans were made for joint training that included counterterrorism for the first time.

Regarding the Philippines, a U. Congressional hearing condemned extra-judicial killings and the impunity with which some elements of Philippine security forces have been treating political opponents and journalists. Special Forces continue to train Philippine soldiers in the south to suppress the Abu Sayyaf terrorists with recent significant successes.

Thailand rejected a U. The two countries are also in a dispute over patent protection for pharmaceuticals needed for public health in Thailand. Peter Pace, chairman of the U. Joint Chiefs, and U. Enhanced Partnership that emphasizes good governance, praised Indonesia for the success of the peace process in Aceh, and assured Vietnamese officials that permanent normal trade relations would be approved by the U.

Marine was convicted of rape and sentenced to 40 years in a Philippine prison. The conviction is being appealed. Although continuing to press the Thai coup leadership to restore democracy, Washington announced plans to hold the annual multinational Cobra Gold military exercise in May and continued to provide assistance for counterterrorism.

Indonesia and Malaysia chastised the United States for backing Israel in the July-August Hezbollah Lebanon war, though both Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur subsequently offered peacekeeping forces to monitor the ceasefire. Ethnic Chinese criminal gangs dominate the drug syndicates operating in these areas. Heroin and methamphetamine produced by these groups are trafficked overland or via the Mekong River primarily through China, Thailand, India, and, to a lesser extent, Laos, Bangladesh, and Burma itself.

Heroin seizures in and , and subsequent investigations, revealed the increased use by international syndicates of the Rangoon international airport and port for trafficking of drugs to the global narcotics market. The overall level of drug abuse is low in Burma compared with neighboring countries, in part because many Burmese are too poor to afford a drug habit.

Traditionally, some farmers use opium as a painkiller and an antidepressant because they lack access to adequate health facilities. There has been a growing shift away from opium smoking toward injecting heroin, a habit that is more addictive and that poses a greater public health risk. Deteriorating economic conditions will likely stifle substantial growth in overall drug consumption, but the trend toward injecting narcotics is a significant concern.

The government maintains that there are only about 70, registered addicts in Burma, but surveys conducted by UNODC, among others, suggest that the addict population could be as high as , NGOs and community leaders report increasing use of heroin and synthetic drugs, particularly among disaffected youth in urban areas and workers in ethnic minority mining communities.

According to a UNODC regional center, an estimated 26 to 30 percent of officially reported HIV cases are attributed to intravenous drug use, one of the highest rates in the world. Burmese demand reduction programs are in part coercive and in part voluntary. Addicts are required to register with the GOB and can be prosecuted if they fail to register and accept treatment. Altogether, more than 21, addicts were prosecuted for failing to register between and The GOB has not provided data since Demand reduction programs and facilities are strictly limited, however.

There are six major drug treatment centers under the Ministry of Health, 49 other smaller detox centers, and eight rehabilitation centers which, together, have reportedly provided treatment to about 55, addicts over the past decade. About 1, addicts have participated in this treatment over the past three years. Since , an additional 6, addicts have sought medical treatment and support from UNODC-sponsored drop-in centers and outreach workers active throughout northeastern Shan State.

There are also a variety of narcotics awareness programs conducted through the public school system. In addition, the government has established demand reduction programs in cooperation with NGOs. As a result of the suspension of direct USG counternarcotics assistance to Burma, the USG engages the Burmese government in regard to narcotics control only on a very limited level.

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DEA, through the U. Embassy in Rangoon, shares drug-related intelligence with the GOB and conducts joint drug-enforcement investigations with Burmese counternarcotics authorities. In , these joint investigations led to significant seizures, arrests, and convictions of drug traffickers and producers.

The GOB regrettably did not provide sufficient cooperation for a joint opium yield survey. Bilateral counternarcotics projects are limited to a small, U. The Burmese government has in recent years made significant gains in reducing opium poppy cultivation and opium production and has cooperated with the UNODC and major regional allies particularly China and Thailand in this fight.

Furthermore, a true opium replacement strategy must undertake an extensive range of counternarcotics actions, including crop eradication, effective law enforcement, alternative development, and support for former poppy farmers to ensure sustainability. The Burmese government must foster cooperation between itself and the ethnic groups involved in drug production and trafficking, especially the Wa, and enforce counternarcotics laws to eliminate poppy cultivation and opium production.

The GOB must also address the explosion of ATS that has flooded the region by gaining support and cooperation from the ethnic groups, especially the Wa, who facilitate the manufacture and distribution of ATS, primarily by ethnic Chinese drug gangs. The GOB must also close production labs and prevent the illicit import of precursor chemicals needed to produce synthetic drugs. The number of drug-related investigations, arrests and seizures in Cambodia continued to increase in This reflects a significant escalation in drug activity and perhaps some increase in law enforcement capacity.

The government is concerned at the increasing use of amphetamine-type stimulants ATS among all socio-economic levels. Cambodia is a party to the UN Drug Convention. Cambodia has experienced a significant increase in recent years in the amount of ATS transiting from the Golden Triangle. Many of these are consumed domestically, though some are also thought to be re-exported to Thailand and Vietnam. In addition, Cambodian authorities believe that foreign crime syndicates, working in concert with Cambodian nationals, have set up mobile laboratories within Cambodia that produce ATS for local distribution and export to Thailand.

Cocaine use by wealthy Cambodians and foreigners in Cambodia is a relatively small, but worrisome new phenomenon. Cambodia is not a producer of opiates; however, it serves as a transit route for heroin from Burma and Laos to international drug markets such as Vietnam, mainland China, Taiwan, and Australia. Heroin and methamphetamine enter Cambodia primarily through Stung Treng, a northern province of Cambodia bordering Laos. Larger shipments of heroin, methamphetamine and marijuana exit Cambodia concealed in shipping containers, speedboats and ocean-going vessels.

Smaller quantities are also smuggled through Phnom Penh International Airport concealed in small briefcases, shoes, and on the bodies of individual travelers. Cannabis cultivation continues despite a government campaign to eradicate it. However, only small amounts of Cambodian cannabis reach the United States. Cambodian law enforcement agencies suffer from limited resources, lack of training, and poor coordination. The NACD, which was reorganized in , has the potential to become an effective policy and coordination unit.

This project seeks, inter alia, to establish the NACD as a functional government body able to undertake drug control planning, coordination, and operations. Although the project is currently slated to expire at the end of , it is likely to be extended through August A successor project has been proposed to target drug-related crime, including transnational organized crime.

The NACD trained policemen, gendarmes, customs officials, seaport officials, and border liaison officials in drug identification and law enforcement. This training complements donor-provided training to increase local law enforcement capacity to test seized substances for use as evidence in criminal trials. In , the Cambodian government took decisive action to strengthen previously weak legal penalties for drug-related offenses.

However, some observers worry that the law is too complex for the relatively weak Cambodian judiciary to use effectively. In the first 11 months of , people mostly Cambodians were arrested for various drug-related offenses. This is an increase over arrests during this same period in , which numbered Total seizures of heroin in were Police arrested 10 people in heroin-related cases in , including a Singaporean man with 3 kilograms of heroin strapped to his legs at Phnom Penh International Airport.

While methamphetamine trafficking is believed to have increased in , the number of methamphetamine pills confiscated was just one-third of levels. Police arrested people in methamphetamine-related cases in and seized , methamphetamine pills. In May, police in Kampot province arrested two Stung Treng-based traffickers intending to smuggle over , amphetamine pills into Vietnam.

In December, police arrested four men carrying 46, methamphetamine pills in Banteay Meanchey province as part of a Thai-based trafficking ring. Corruption remains pervasive in Cambodia, making Cambodia highly vulnerable to penetration by drug traffickers and foreign crime syndicates. Senior Cambodian government officials assert that they want to combat trafficking and production; however, corruption, abysmally low salaries for civil servants, and an acute shortage of trained personnel severely limit sustained advances in effective law enforcement. The judicial system is weak, and there have been numerous cases of defendants in important criminal cases having charges against them dropped after paying relatively small fines.

An informal donor working group, including the US, is working closely with the government to produce a revised draft anticorruption law that meets international best practices. Observers expect that the National Assembly will pass this law in Cambodia is a party to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols against migrant smuggling and illegal manufacturing and trafficking in firearms. During , square meters of cannabis plantations were destroyed; Cambodia shares porous borders with Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam and lies near the major trafficking routes for Southeast Asian heroin.

Enforcement of the border region with Laos on the Mekong River, which is permeated with islands and mangroves, is nearly impossible due to lack of boats and fuel among law enforcement forces. Some heroin and marijuana are believed to enter and exit Cambodia via locations along the Gulf-including the deep water port of Sihanoukville-as well as the river port of Phnom Penh. Airports in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap suffer from lax customs and immigration controls. Some illegal narcotics are believed to transit these airports en route to foreign destinations.

Cambodia has several high-quality, improved-surface roads originating in Phenom Phen which have a limited reach toward remote interior regions of the country. To that end, the Chinese have spent millions of dollars towards this commitment and are currently constructing excellent new roads and bridges connecting the border regions with the main cities and rural areas in Cambodia. Once these roads are completed, high-speed transportation routes will facilitate even greater movement of drugs and supplies across the country.

Domestic Programs Demand Reduction. A UNODC treatment and rehabilitation project is expected to start providing services to addicts and increasing the capacity of health and human services to deal effectively with drug treatment issues in early For the first time in Cambodia in over three decades, there has been relative political stability since the formation of coalition governments following national elections in and However, freedom of expression declined notably during An opposition party parliamentarian was sentenced to seven years in prison on questionable charges of fraud and forming an illegal army.

A journalist and a trade union leader were arrested on charges of defamation and incitement for criticizing a controversial border treaty with Vietnam. Several other political activists fled the country after warrants were issued for their arrest.

Told by Aaron Shepard

The challenges for Cambodia include: One unique challenge which Cambodia faces is the loss of many of its best trained professionals in the Khmer Rouge Killing Fields incidents during, and after the Second Indo-China War. Even with the active support of the international community there will be continuing gaps in performance for the foreseeable future. Cambodia regularly hosts visits from Bangkok-based DEA personnel, and Cambodian authorities cooperate actively with DEA, including the areas of joint operations and operational intelligence sharing.

In September , Bangkok-based DEA personnel conducted basic intelligence analysis training for law enforcement officials. The three-week programs increased the ability of Cambodian police, military, and immigration officials to interdict transnational threats, including narcotics. Cambodia is making progress toward more effective institutional law enforcement against illegal narcotics trafficking; however, its capacity to implement an effective, systematic approach to counternarcotics operations remains low.

However, after training these officers return to an environment of scarce resources and pervasive corruption. As part of the JIATF-West program, Cambodian officials can be trained in land and maritime navigation and boat maintenance, but equipment to perform these tasks is often shoddy or completely lacking. However, will see an expansion in DEA training activities, as, for the first time in more than a decade, State Department counternarcotics funding will be available for training run via DEA headquarters.

U.S. Department of State

Training in basic investigation techniques is scheduled for January and a course on airport interdiction is planned for March The United States will try to assist Cambodia as Cambodia strives for better law enforcement performance and administration of justice. China was removed from the list of Major Drug Transit Countries in because there was no evidence drugs transiting China affected the U.

Heroin use persists, particularly in southwest China. There continues to be an upsurge in the consumption of synthetic drugs such as ecstasy MDMA and crystal methamphetamine, otherwise known as "ice". Chinese authorities view drug trafficking and abuse as a major threat to national security, the economy and national and regional stability, but corruption in far-flung drug producing and drug transit regions of the PRC limit the accomplishments of dedicated enforcement officials. China has made great strides to integrate regional and global counternarcotics efforts.

China is a party to the UN Drug Convention. In , the Chinese Government also continued to provide U. According to the Chinese Government, drug abuse in China continues to rise and there were, as of , 1. Youths made up 74 percent of the registered drug addicts. The majority of registered drug addicts are heroin users. Illegal drug use was recorded in 2, cities, counties, and districts across China. The Chinese Government reports about 34, recent deaths from drug overdose, a significant increase from about 25, deaths as of the end of Like large cities of relative affluence all over the world, Chinese cities have seen a significant rise in the urban culture of nightclubs and raves, and their attendant problems of drug abuse.

These changes in China have increased abuse of recreational drugs, such as ecstasy and ATS. Officials have responded with several public awareness campaigns and increased enforcement, but abuse of synthetic drugs continues on an up-tick, as in the United States and Europe.

China has one of the largest chemical industries in the world. China monitors all 22 of the chemicals listed in the UN Drug Convention. Chinese authorities report they seized over tons of precursor chemicals and prevented a further 3, tons from leaving the country in China continues to be a strong partner of the United States and other concerned countries in implementing a system of pre-export notification of dual-use precursor chemicals.

The document covers all the major goals of the UN Convention, emphasizing education, rehabilitation, eradication, precursor chemical control and interdiction. In November China passed its first administrative law on precursor chemicals aimed at preventing the illicit use of precursor chemicals. This law represents the first action by the PRC to control domestic sale of precursor chemicals; previous laws and regulations focused solely on imports and exports. In June , the PRC published an authoritative five-year plan to tackle the drug problem, which provided the Ministry of Public Security MPS with a mandate to step up counternarcotics efforts.

The national budget for counternarcotics efforts has seen regular increases. The total narcotics budget, however, is significantly higher, because each province administers its own counternarcotics budget. China continued to cooperate with regional and international partners, including the U. The counternarcotics efforts at the national level and those at the provincial level have grown substantially, with increased training and exchange programs with other Asian law enforcement agencies. Some of their successes include: Additionally, in September , a joint investigation conducted by China, Laos, Thailand and Burma resulted in a combined seizure of kilograms of heroin in Burma.

The ringleader of this shipment was a Chinese national who was arrested in Laos and eventually deported to China. In order to increase its effectiveness in law enforcement, the NNCC reorganized its enforcement operations, establishing separate heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants ATS enforcement groups at both the ministerial and provincial levels. Prior to , enforcement was handled by one organization and focused primarily on heroin.

The MPS continues to provide strategic and concrete information to its DEA counterparts to actively target drug rings. In addition, the MPS routinely facilitates travel of U. In part due to international cooperation with its neighbors in the Golden Triangle, the MPS reports that poppy cultivation in Laos and Burma has been reduced by 44, hectares in recent years, which amounts to a 27 percent decrease in the total area of production since Official corruption in China is a serious problem.

Anticorruption campaigns have led to arrests of many lower-level government personnel and some more senior-level officials. Chinese officials reported that in there were more than 32, people investigated for alleged corruption and that over half were found to be guilty. While narcotics-related official corruption exists in China, it is seldom reported in the press. The MPS takes allegations of drug-related corruption seriously, launching investigations as appropriate. Most cases appear to have involved lower-level district and county officials.

Although there is no substantive evidence indicating senior-level corruption in drug trafficking, the quantity of drugs trafficked within the PRC raises suspicions that official corruption is a factor in trafficking in certain provinces bordering drug-producing regions, such as Yunnan, and in Guangdong and Fujian, where narcotics trafficking and other forms of transnational crimes are prevalent. Official corruption cannot be discounted among the factors enabling organized criminal networks to operate in certain regions of China, despite the best efforts of authorities at the central government level.

Narcotics-related corruption does not appear to have adversely affected on-going law enforcement cases in which the U. China is engaged in an anticorruption dialogue with the United States through the Joint Liaison Working Group process. China actively cooperates with other countries to fight drug trafficking. China, along with its ASEAN partners, held meetings in order to map out a regional counternarcotics cooperative mechanism in pursuit of making the region drug-free by In June, Burma, China, India, Laos and Thailand signed the Chiang Rai Declaration pledging to implement cooperative counternarcotics programs and exchange counternarcotics information.

China has signed over 30 mutual legal assistance agreements with 24 countries, but the U. The PRC has effectively eradicated the production of drug-related crops within China. Opium, coca and other drug crops are not produced in China in significant quantities. The PRC is a main cultivator of natural ephedra, which is used in the production of amphetamine. The Chinese Government tightly controls exports of this key input for ATS, but like other dual-use chemicals, China remains a significant source of chemicals diverted to illicit uses, some diversions to countries as far away from China as Europe.

The Chinese Government continues to make shutting down illicit drug laboratories a top priority. The MPS seized drug processing laboratories between July and August seeking update for China continues to be used as a transshipment route for drugs produced in the "Golden Triangle" to the international market, despite counternarcotics cooperation with neighbors such as Vietnam, Thailand and Burma. Drugs such as heroin, methamphetamine and ketamine are being smuggled into Xinjiang Province and then distributed throughout China. According to the MPS, China had 1. The majority of registered drug users are addicted to heroin.

The Ministry of Education MOE and the NNCC have expanded drug education and prevention programs, aimed at preventing children from ages 12 to 18 from getting involved in drugs. Chinese officials report the distribution of 25, counternarcotics posters in In , , drug awareness pamphlets were distributed and , special action committees were formed to carry out drug control publicity and education activities. Counternarcotics cooperation between China and the United States continues to develop in a positive way.

The information shared by China is leading to progress in attacking drug-smuggling rings that have an impact on the U. The most significant problem in bilateral counternarcotics cooperation remains the lack of progress toward concluding a bilateral Letter of Agreement LOA enabling the U. Government to extend counternarcotics assistance to China. Reaching agreement on the LOA is a major U. Government would welcome routinely receiving samples of all drugs seized by Chinese authorities. Despite these issues, bilateral enforcement cooperation remains on track and is expected to continue to improve over the coming year.

Some traffickers continue to operate out of Hong Kong to arrange shipments from nearby drug-producing countries via Hong Kong to the international market, including to the United States. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region HKSAR actively combats drug trafficking and abuse through legislation and law enforcement, preventive education and publicity, treatment and rehabilitation, as well as research and external cooperation. Despite the diminished role, some drugs continue to transit Hong Kong to the United States and the international market.

Some drug-traffickers continue to use Hong Kong as their financial base of operations, including investors involved in international drug trafficking activity who reside in Hong Kong. Hong Kong law enforcement officials maintain very cooperative liaison relationships with their U. According to HKSAR authorities, drugs seized in Hong Kong are smuggled mostly for local consumption and to a lesser extent for further distribution in the international market, including the United States.

Hong Kong experienced an overall decrease in drug abuse in Heroin was the most commonly abused drug, though the number of heroin abusers also dropped slightly from Also noted was a significant drop of 30 percent in ketamine abusers over the same period in However, the CRDA noted that both the number and proportion of drug abusers taking more than one drug was on the rise, as was the number of female drug abusers.

In , the Hong Kong Government again gave a high priority to tackling psychotropic substance abuse. The Hong Kong Government has identified the continuing prevalence of psychotropic substance abuse and the growing trend of young people experimenting with drugs as their major area of concern in the battle against drug abuse and trafficking. Although there were no major policy changes in and , the Hong Kong Government continued to work with existing counternarcotics policies and strategies in drug-prevention efforts.

Minor policy changes included updating lists of prescription medicines allowed for storage in local hospitals and nurseries as well as an expansion of the reporting network of the Central Registry of Drug Abuse to enable better monitoring of drug abuse in Hong Kong. Their counternarcotics efforts focus on the suppression of drug trafficking and the control of precursor chemicals.

The Hong Kong Police have adopted a three-level approach to combat narcotics distribution: DEA office in Hong Kong, closely monitors the usage of precursor chemicals and tracks the export of suspicious precursor chemical shipments to worldwide destinations with significant results impacting on several regions including the United States.

HKCED continued to aggressively combat drug trafficking in and carried out numerous significant drug seizures, including a record seizure of As a matter of government policy, the HKSAR does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Similarly, no senior government official is alleged to have participated in such activities. Some drugs continue to flow through Hong Kong for the overseas market, including the United States.

Traffickers use land routes through mainland China to smuggle heroin into Hong Kong. The heavy volume of vehicle and passenger traffic at the land boundary between PRC and Hong Kong continues to pose difficulties in the fight against the trafficking of drugs into Hong Kong. The air cargo clearance system, the land border system and the customs control system are all capable of quickly processing information on all import and export cargoes, cross-border vehicles and vessels.

The Hong Kong drug trade is primarily dominated by the local Chinese population. Contrary to common belief, there is not a significant and direct connection between Hong Kong narcotics activity and Hong Kong triads at the wholesale level. Therefore, drug investigations are not focused on known triad societies, but rather on the particular trafficking syndicates or individuals involved.

In , the trafficking destined for mainland China by Southeast Asians became more prominent. As a result, seizures of ketamine have spiraled upwards; shipments of multi-kilo loads of ketamine have been intercepted. Hong Kong has "mutual legal assistance in criminal matters agreements" with the United States and many other countries. Hong Kong has also signed surrender of fugitive offenders agreements with 14 countries, including the U.

Hong Kong also signed transfer of sentenced persons agreements with seven countries, including the U. Hong Kong law enforcement agencies enjoy a close and cooperative working relationship with their mainland counterparts and counterparts in many countries. In the last few years, liaison information sharing and data-networking functions, such as customs information, have been formalized and have been successful in increasing the levels of inter-system cooperation and efficiency.

Because intermittent drug trafficking through Hong Kong often involves mainland China aspects, foreign law enforcement agencies in Hong Kong such as the U. The Hong Kong Government uses a "five-pronged" approach to confront domestic drug problems, covering legislation and law enforcement; preventive education and publicity; treatment and rehabilitation; research; and external co-operation.

Southeast Asia

A counternarcotics publicity program, in collaboration with local radio, kicked off in April The program was designed to allow Hong Kong youth to share their experiences and knowledge publicly through the radio and internet. Additionally, a series of television programs focusing on drug abuse issues will be produced jointly with local Hong Kong T.

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The Government also continued to commission nongovernment organizations to assist in educating primary and secondary school children. Since the opening in June , a total of , students from schools attended drug education programs sponsored by the Government. The Hong Kong Government also continued to implement a comprehensive drug treatment and rehabilitation program in The Department of Health and the Social Welfare Department continued to operate seven residential drug treatment centers and five counseling centers for psychotropic substance abusers and the Department of Health continued its operation of a methadone treatment program.

The Correctional Services Department continued to provide compulsory treatment for convicted persons with drug abuse problems. Government and the HKSAR continue to promote sharing of proceeds from joint counternarcotics investigations. In May , Hong Kong began participating in the U. From to October , Hong Kong Customs, Hong Kong Department of Health and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration launched a joint operation codenamed "Cold Remedy" to monitor the movement of precursor chemicals which are used in the production of methamphetamine and other drugs from Hong Kong to high-risk countries.

The operation effectively decreased the frequency of these shipments and, through the high level of information exchange and timely international tracking, indicated strong cooperation between Hong Kong Government officials and their U. To further strengthen international cooperation against trafficking of precursors used in the production of pseudoephedrine, Hong Kong secured an agreement with the U.

The Hong Kong Government has proven to be a valuable partner in the fight against drug trafficking and abuse. Hong Kong law enforcement agencies, among the most effective in the region, continue to cooperate closely with U. Government will continue to encourage Hong Kong to maintain its active role in counternarcotics efforts. Although Indonesia is not a major drug producing, consuming, or drug transit country, Indonesia continues to have a growing problem in all three areas. In addition, recent large seizures point to ecstasy production in Indonesia, as well.

The Indonesian National Police INP has participated in several international donor-initiated training programs and continues to commit increased resources to counternarcotics efforts. The INP has received U. INP efforts are firmly based on counternarcotics legislation and international agreements. The INP relies heavily on assistance from major international donors for training and equipment, including the U. Indonesia is a party to the UN Drug Convention. All major groups of illegal drugs are readily available in Indonesia: Indonesian authorities report that much of the heroin trade in Indonesia is controlled and directed by West African and Nepalese traffickers, often utilizing Thailand and Singapore as transit points for their couriers.

In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the domestic large scale multi hundred kilogram quantities production of methamphetamine and MDMA in Indonesia. Indonesian authorities report that the domestic production of methamphetamine and MDMA in Indonesia is controlled by Indonesian and Chinese syndicates, utilizing precursor chemical sources of supply in the PRC.

INP reports that marijuana is cultivated throughout Indonesia, especially the Aceh Province of Northern Sumatra, where large scale cultivation occurs. During , INP identified 66 marijuana fields, destroying , marijuana plants, comprising a total of approximately Although cocaine seizures continue to occur in major Indonesian airports, the market for cocaine in Indonesia is very small. Cocaine seizures made by INP are believed to be associated with the transshipment of the drug to more lucrative markets, specifically Australia.

The Indonesian counternarcotics code is sufficiently inclusive to enable police, prosecutors, and the judiciary to arrest, prosecute, and adjudicate narcotics cases; however, the continued lack of modern detection, enforcement and investigative methodologies and technology, as well as the presence of pervasive corruption, are the greatest obstacles to advancing counternarcotics efforts.

The National Narcotics Board BNN continues to strive to improve interagency cooperation in drug enforcement, interdiction, and precursor control. The mission of the JIACDOC is to improve coordination and information exchange between various Indonesian law enforcement agencies related to drug enforcement.

The INP Narcotics and Organized Crime Directorate continues to improve its ability to investigate and dismantle international drug trafficking syndicates, for example, in November INP conducted a raid , dismantling the largest amphetamine type substance ATS manufacturing plaint in Indonesian history, producing both crystal methamphetamine and MDMA at the time of the raid. The Narcotics Directorate has become increasingly active in regional targeting conferences designed to coordinate efforts against transnational drug and crime organizations.

The maritime counternarcotics effort depends on a myriad of Indonesian law enforcement agencies. Work in the Indonesian Government to define the roles of these agencies, including the Navy and the INP Air and Sea police, continue so as to avoid duplication. For the moment however, no effective campaign can be mounted against possible trafficking by sea. Any attempt to check trafficking by sea will be very challenging, given the many islands that make up the Indonesian Archipelago.

The Indonesian courts have sentenced approximately 21 drug traffickers to death since January In , the Indonesian government began to carry out these sentences, executing three individuals. Indonesia produces enough marijuana for domestic consumption. As a matter of government policy and practice, the GOI does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of proceeds from illegal transactions. Corruption in Indonesia, however, is endemic, despite laws against it, and seriously limits the effectiveness of all law enforcement, including narcotics law enforcement.

The recently elected administration has made anticorruption efforts a major policy initiative, but as long as official salaries remain very low, some officials will be tempted to accept bribes. Indonesia and the United States maintain excellent law enforcement cooperation on narcotics cases. Indonesia continues to work closely with the DEA regional office in Singapore on narcotics investigations.

In , the U. The goals of the project are to standardize and computerize the reporting methods related to narcotics investigations and seizures, to develop a drug intelligence database, and to build an information network designed to connect all of the provinces of Indonesia. Japan is not a significant producer of narcotics, but it is target country for traffickers in a wide variety of narcotics. MDMA ecstasy is of growing concern in Japan; several large seizures occurred in and ecstasy is now readily available in Tokyo nightclubs.

Heroin and cocaine are also available in Japan, but they are relatively unpopular. The Japanese legal system discourages proactive investigative techniques for pursuing drug traffickers; consequently, Japanese law enforcement is forced to be primarily reactive in their investigations. Despite legal and bureaucratic restrictions, Japanese law enforcement is emerging as a prominent partner with United States and international law enforcement agencies in pursuit of large-scale international drug trafficking organizations DTOs.

Furthermore, Japan has taken a leadership role within the Asia-Pacific region by hosting training and seminars. DEA Tokyo acts as an advisory, support and training resource to Japanese law enforcement agencies, and conducts joint multinational investigations with its Japanese partners. Japan is a party to the U N Drug Convention. Japan is not a significant producer of narcotics. Licit cultivation of opium poppies, coca plants, and cannabis for research is done on a modest scale and is strictly monitored and controlled by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.

Recently, seizures of methamphetamine coming from the U. Canada emerged as a significant source of methamphetamine and marijuana in Methamphetamine trafficking remains a significant source of income for Japanese organized crime. Approximately 80 percent of all drug arrests in Japan involve methamphetamine. The National Police Agency NPA estimates there are , methamphetamine addicts, and between one and three million casual users nationwide.

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Australia And Southeast Asia (The Crystallization Of A Relationship) by Ravindra Varma Southeast Asia has become a battle-ground of power-politics today. Other Publications. Close. The Cosmic Zoo · This Land is Ours · Candellas of Jejakabhukti · Life in the Upanishads · Makers of Modern Orissa · Fundamental.

Although not a producer of methamphetamine, Japan is one of the largest markets for methamphetamine in Asia. Government of Japan GOJ authorities unofficially estimate that between ten and twenty metric tons of this substance is trafficked annually into Japan. Japanese officials are currently in the process of adding ketamine to the list of prohibited drugs.

Compared to past years, Japanese law enforcement has made greater attempts to be proactive in its approach to drug law enforcement. Police counternarcotics efforts tend to focus on Japanese organized crime and foreigner operated DTOs, the main smugglers and distributors of drugs.

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In November China passed its first administrative law on precursor chemicals aimed at preventing the illicit use of precursor chemicals. The national budget for counternarcotics efforts has seen regular increases. Declining poppy cultivation over the last ten years has been matched by a sharp increase in the production and export of synthetic drugs. Corruption in the Lao PDR, long present in petty forms, may be rising among higher-ranking officials as the potential for graft income grows. While figures are not yet available, residential and outpatient rehabilitation centers reported 5, admission cases in Significant impediments to full treatment of all opium addicts include the ill health of many elderly users, the remote location of some addict populations, and the lack of sufficient rural health care infrastructure to displace the traditional medicinal use of opium, which often serves as the initial entree into addiction.

This resulted in the arrests of two U. Overall, drug-related arrests January-June, increased 6. Through September , Japanese authorities have seized approximately kilograms of methamphetamine, compared to the kilograms seized in The popularity of ecstasy continued to grow. MDMA seizures this year are on pace to exceed the , seized in Heroin imports from Southeast Asia remain low; only 32 grams of heroin and 1, grams of opium were seized through September Heroin, opium, and cannabis use continues to be significantly lower than that of other illegal drugs in the country.

However, the growing number of arrests involving marijuana and hashish indicates the increasing popularity of these substances. Through September , approximately kilograms of marijuana and approximately kilograms of hashish have been seized in Japan. Cocaine seizures remain low, with approximately 2. This amount is much lower than the anomalous 86 kilograms seized in , and slightly higher than the 2. As a matter of government policy, the GOJ does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics, psychotropic drugs, controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.

An extradition treaty and a customs mutual assistance agreement are in force between the United States and Japan. Department of Justice in connection with investigations, prosecutions and other proceedings in criminal matters. Although Japan is not a significant cultivator or manufacturer of controlled substances, it is a major producer of 60 types of dual-use precursor chemicals. Ephedrine is also an essential ingredient in methamphetamine. DEA Tokyo works closely with its Japanese counterparts to monitor end users of dual use precursors. With few exceptions, all drugs illicitly trafficked into Japan are smuggled from overseas.

Drug treatment programs are small and generally run by private organizations. GOJ provides narcotics-related counseling focused on drug prevention and supports the rehabilitation of addicts at prefectural regional centers. The Japanese Government continues to support a number of drug awareness campaigns designed to inform the public about the growing use of stimulants in the country, especially among junior and senior high school students.

The Ministry of Health and Welfare, along with prefectural governments and private organizations, continues to run national publicity campaigns and to promote drug education programs at the community level. DEA Tokyo will work closely with its Japanese counterparts to offer support in conducting investigations on international drug trafficking, money laundering, and other crimes. DEA will continue to pursue an aggressive education and information-sharing program with Japanese law enforcement agencies to foster knowledge of money laundering investigations, and their relationship to narcotics trafficking and terrorist financing.

In , Laos enjoyed unprecedented success in its battle against opium, in no small part due to the determined efforts of the Government of Laos GOL supported by U. State Department counternarcotics funding. Crop control programs reduced poppy cultivation and production by an estimated 45 percent in just one year.

Demand reduction programs reduced addiction by a claimed 30 percent of the known addict population. If successful alternative development is able to secure this victory, Laos could cease to be a major producer of opium in the near future. However, opium addiction is a persistent problem, decades in the making; claims of rapid success in treating addicts could prove to be short-lived.

A 30 percent reduction in addict populations in a single year would be almost without precedent worldwide. Unfortunately, just as Laos appears to be on the verge of a major triumph against opium, a new threat has appeared in the form of amphetamine type stimulants ATS. Focused demand reduction programs, more robust law enforcement, and better international cooperation will be necessary if Laos is not to become both a major ATS consumer and transit country.

Laos is a party to the UN Drug Convention. In contrast, Laos may be on the verge of becoming a major transit country for ATS and associated precursors. Increasing prices may be discouraging some opium use even as it serves as a stimulus to production. USG survey results indicate that in some remote locations, prices may have been even higher during the year, based on the local specifics of supply and demand.

While this policy was not new, the GOL pursued it vigorously during the past year and this helped to bring Laos closer to its stated objective. He reminded provincial leaders that they were accountable for the success or failure of the policy and that the central government would monitor their performance. The GOL sought to implement this policy in several ways:. First, Laos undertook a nationwide program to promote "opium awareness," focused on sixty-two districts where poppy cultivation has been or continues to be a serious problem.

The campaign utilized local, law enforcement, and public health officials to educate suspected opium producing villages on Lao narcotics law, the hazards of addiction, and alternative development opportunities for those who stop producing. One of the key objectives of the campaign was to garner voluntary compliance and a written commitment from each of the target villages and cultivators that they would no longer plant poppy. The campaign also sought to assure that villagers understood the law and the potential legal consequences if they chose to violate it.

As part of this campaign, officials attempted to confiscate poppy seed before cultivators could sow it, though the effectiveness of that effort was questionable. Second, the GOL, with support from the US, UN and other international partners, continued to pursue a variety of alternative development programs. These included crop substitution, rice cultivation, road construction, building community infrastructure, installing clean water systems, opening livestock banks, establishing ecotourism venues, developing village health care, providing vocational training, and promoting literacy education, particularly among women.

The bulk of the counternarcotics funds provided by donors to the GOL were committed to alternative development, as these initiatives provide the best long-term solution to the poverty that is the root cause of opium production. Third, the GOL, again with substantial support from international donors including the USG, sought to bring about an end to opium addiction throughout the country. With the knowledge that it will be next to impossible to eliminate all poppy cultivation as long as there is a substantial domestic demand, LCDC conducted a conference in late November to identify those provinces that had achieved their addict detoxification targets, and to urge those which were lagging behind to redouble their efforts.

Laos is in the process of implementing a pilot program that holds the promise of more cost effective detoxification, based in part on lessons learned from regional partners. Opium addiction is a persistent problem; however, and claims of rapid success could prove to be short-lived. Laos is considering revising its penal code and criminal procedures to meet the challenge of growing ATS abuse, with the assistance of several European partners.

The article is incomplete and does not provide a coherent legal framework for the control of narcotics and other substances listed in relevant UN conventions, to which it is a party, such as the Single Convention. A consequence of this is that Lao law does not always distinguish between illicit and licit medical use of some controlled drugs.

The new draft legislation provides a more complete and methodical legal framework for drug enforcement, and includes provisions for enhanced cooperation against illicit transit. Unfortunately, changes in the legal code are not always published in the press, and can remain unknown to government officials and the public alike. Poppy cultivation in Laos declined dramatically in , and this success stands as an unqualified victory for Laos and its international partners, especially the U. According to USG figures, the area under cultivation declined from 10, hectares in to 5, hectares in This was a 45 percent reduction in cultivation in just one year.

The UNODC survey conducted in indicated an even steeper decline, from 6, hectares in to approximately 1, in , a 74 percent drop. The decline in opium production paralleled that in opium cultivation. UNODC survey results showed a more rapid reduction, from 43 tons in to 14 tons in , a 67 percent decline. Thanks to international assistance, Laos can accurately estimate opium cultivation, production, and addiction, but currently does not possess the means to accurately assess the extent of production, transit, and distribution of ATS and its precursors.

Production and transit costs for opium and ATS are low. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some traffickers formerly involved in opium may now be shifting to ATS because it is more mobile, a safer investment, the returns are faster, and the market is growing. There are reports that former heroin traffickers are moving into the hospitality industry, commercial forestry, other legitimate businesses, and money laundering.

The increase in seizures of ATS near its borders and data indicating rapid growth in use provide what little insight there is into the ATS problem in Laos. Opium seizures during the first nine months of totaled Heroin seizures thru September stood at ATS seizures were also slightly slower, at 1,, pills in nine months, compared to the first half 3,, of Cannabis seizures, however, appeared to speed up, with 1.

Lao authorities opened drug related cases in , resulting in several hundred arrests. These prosecutions were almost entirely of street pushers, and Laos has demonstrated a serious inability to investigate or develop cases against major traffickers without external assistance and in some cases significant international pressure. Laos relies primarily upon the regulatory agencies of producing states, such as China, to prevent illicit shipments of precursor chemicals into Laos, which currently does not have any domestic production capacity. The GOL did not report any precursor chemical seizures in While UNODC noted that Lao law enforcement cooperation with neighboring countries was generally good in , the USG found that bilateral cooperation with Laos had improved only slightly, and remained unsatisfactory.

With the exception of the Customs Department, the GOL failed to make use of the opportunities for cooperation afforded by the DEA, which continued to provide law enforcement support to Lao agencies, but received very little feedback in return. International Organizations IOs with experience in Laos have reported that the GOL does seize assets such as homes, plots of land, automobiles and jewelry for a variety of criminal offences including but not exclusively related to narcotics violations.

The legal framework for and ultimate disposition of asset seizures is not clear, transparent, or public, and the proceeds from seizures may be used to supplement the budgets of state agencies. Corruption in the Lao PDR, long present in petty forms, may be rising among higher-ranking officials as the potential for graft income grows.

Civil servants receive very little pay, and those able to use their positions to advantage, such as police and customs officials, can augment their salary through corruption, particularly in areas distant from central government oversight. Lao law explicitly prohibits corruption, and some officials have been removed and prosecuted for corrupt acts, including at least one senior official in At this event, Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Unfortunately, the same weaknesses that undermine counternarcotics law enforcement and facilitate corruption make fighting the latter a daunting challenge.

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Laos is achieving or making an earnest effort to achieve the performance goals listed in the Crop Control and Demand Reduction LOAs, but is far from doing so with regard to the goals enumerated in the Law Enforcement LOA. Laos has legal assistance agreements with China, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Burma, and it signed an agreement for legal cooperation on drug trafficking with Indonesia in Laos provided the U. The GOL has assisted in the arrest and extradition of individuals to some of those nations, and recently extradited a major trafficker to Burma.

The USG estimate for poppy cultivation is 5, hectares, and about 69 percent of the crop is concentrated in Phongsaly, Houaphan, and Luang Namtha provinces in northern Laos. Oudomxai Province had the greatest decline in production, down 75 percent from USG methodology included imagery samples from satellites. According to the survey report published in June , poppy cultivation is in a range from 2, to hectares, with a mean value of 1, Digital cameras recorded opium fields for later analysis.

In addition, 21 teams conducted surveys with the headmen of villages in eight provinces. Drought significantly affected production in , with USG estimated yields ranging from 3 to 7 kilograms per hectare, and UNODC estimates at an average of 8 kilograms per hectare. From a high of 42, hectares when U.