Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond

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  • The Work Of A Nation. The Center of Intelligence.
  • Intelligence and Surprise Attack | Georgetown University Press
  • Intelligence and Surprise Attack
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    • Otherwise, Americans are too distracted and detached to think any disaster will happen to them, although there are many cited examples to the contrary now that lone wolves are loose in the country.

    RELATED TITLES

    Pretty good read for Homeland Security students and those that are interested. It covers good subjects that aren't really touched upon such as the battle of Midway and the Tet Offensive. One person found this helpful. Kindle Edition Verified Purchase. Well researched summary of events and sources. This book is so informative. I got this for school, but I also enjoyed reading it. I learned so much. It discusses the intelligence factor of these attacks, whether intelligence dropped the ball or was missed entirely or not acted on even though there may have been advanced warning.

    The Work Of A Nation. The Center of Intelligence.

    While the audiobook was incredibly good, at times it was a little tedious. That doesn't take away from my five stars though because it was informative and did pose some very interesting facts. One of the earlier points made was concerning the intel surrounding Pearl Harbor. My question is if they did indeed know this was an imminent threat, what could have been done to prevent it aside from evacuation. I'm unsure whether or not we had the proper technology to have stopped it. I just don't know.

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    Overall, I thought this was a great audiobook and would definitely recommend it for anyone interested in this subject. Dahl provides great examples and extensive research throughout the timeline regarding intel for all these events. Gully did a fantastic job narrating this audiobook.

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    I liked the style he used, informative and reporter like which came across great. He spoke clearly and kept a steady pace. His work was flawless. This book is excellent. Dahl presents the facts without much bias, opting for the logical reasons behind terrorist attacks instead of the "doomed to fail" approach.

    Intelligence and Surprise Attack | Georgetown University Press

    He is methodical in his presentation of the facts and his conclusions. I found the book quite interesting and would recommend it to friends and family, no matter their level of understanding of the topic. I listened to the audio version and I found John N. Gully to be very clear and easy to understand.

    Intelligence and Surprise Attack

    His speed as great. Great read and highly interesting.

    See all 9 reviews. Amazon Giveaway allows you to run promotional giveaways in order to create buzz, reward your audience, and attract new followers and customers. Learn more about Amazon Giveaway. Set up a giveaway. The Problem of Conventional Surprise Attack 2.

    Challenging the Conventional Wisdom 3. The Battle of Midway: Explaining Intelligence Success 4. The Problem of Terrorist Surprise Attack 5. The East Africa Embassy Bombings: Disaster Despite Warning 6.

    Preventing a Day of Terror 7. A New Explanation 8. Why Do Terrorist Plots Fail? Preventing Surprise Attacks Today Appendix: Also available as an Audiobook. Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad.

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    How to Be a Counterintelligence Officer. The Rise and Fall of Intelligence. His insider status shows through, as he examines the complexity of preventing an intelligence failure. Dahl looks at four steps that need to be accomplished to prevent a failure: This fourth step is a unique contribution of his work. Dahl expects a lot from intelligence producers. To avoid being blamed with a failure, CIA must not only collect sufficient, specific information to provide for both strategic and tactical warning, it must also shepherd this information through an analytic production process that results in timely dissemination to the policymakers who need it, and convince them of the accuracy of the intelligence—even though the message is likely not one the policymakers will want to hear.

    If policymakers refuse to accept the intelligence, then Dahl lays the blame back on CIA, insisting the rejection must be due to a lack of clarity or specificity. While on one hand the authors decry the large number of political science majors among the analyst ranks, they also recommend bringing in more anthropologists and sociologists—as if one form of social science would balance another. The authors get little right when it comes to analysis. However, the Cassandras cited do not live up to the title.

    None of the four intelligence failures they cite offers a clear, well documented example of a person or persons who clearly predicted exactly what happened in advance and had views that could have changed the outcome. Jones and Silberzahn are right on one point however: In the interim, intelligence professionals will have to continue to live with accusations of failure, real and imagined, and continue to provide US policymakers with the answers they need to keep the country safe.

    Jones and Silberzahn need to study the realities of CIA and the intelligence process more closely before offering ideas for improvements. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this journal are those of the authors. Nothing in any of the articles should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of their factual statements and interpretations.

    Articles by non-US government employees are copyrighted.

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